The BG-simulation is a powerful reduction algorithm designed for asynchronous read/write crashprone systems. It allows a set of (t + 1) asynchronous sequential processes to wait-free simulate (i.e., despite the crash of up to t of them) an arbitrary number n of processes under the assumption that at most t of them may crash. The BG simulation shows that, in read/write systems, the crucial parameter is not the number n of processes, but the upper bound t on the number of process crashes.
Introduction
What is the Borowsky-Gafni (BG) simulation and why is it important? Considering an asynchronous system where processes can crash, the (n, k)-set agreement problem is a basic distributed decision task defined as follows [11] . Each of the n processes proposes a value, and every process that does not crash has to decide a value (termination), such that a decided value is a proposed value (validity) and at most k different values are decided (agreement). The consensus problem corresponds to the particular case k = 1.
The (n, k)-set agreement is fundamental because it captures the essence of fault-tolerant distributed computability issues. A central question related to asynchronous distributed computability is the following: "Can we use a solution to the (n, k)-set agreement problem as a subroutine to solve the (n , k )-set agreement problem, when at most t < min(n, n ) processes may crash?" ("Is (n , k )-set agreement reducible to (n, k)-set agreement?".) The BG simulation (initially sketched in [6] and then formalized in a journal version [7] , where, in addition, a formal definition of "reducibility" is given) answers this fundamental question. It states that the answer is "yes" if k ≥ k and "no" if k ≤ t < k. As we can see, the answer "yes" does not depend on the number of processes.
To this end, the algorithm described in [7] allows (t + 1) processes to simulate a large number n of asynchronous processes that communicate through read/write registers, and collectively solve a decision task, in the presence of at most t crashes. Each of the (t + 1) simulator processes simulates all the n processes. These (t + 1) simulator processes cooperate through underlying objects that allow them to agree on a single output for each of the non-deterministic statements issued by every simulated process. (These underlying objects, called safe agreement objects, can be built of top of read/write atomic registers.)
Let BG(RW,C) denote the basic BG simulation algorithm [7] (RW stands for "read/write communication", and C stands for "crash failures"). BG(RW,C) is "symmetric" in the sense that each of the n processes is simulated by every simulator, and the (t + 1) simulators are "equal" with respect to each simulated process, namely, (1) every simulator fairly simulates all the processes, and (2) the crash of a simulator entails the crash of at most one simulated process. This symmetry allows BG(RW,C) to be suited to colorless tasks (i.e., distributed computing problems where the value decided by a process can be decided by any process [17] ). BG(RW,C) has then been extended to colored tasks (i.e., tasks such as renaming [3] , where a process cannot systematically borrow its output from another process). Extended BG simulation is addressed in [14, 22] . Algorithmic pedagogical presentations of the BG simulation can be found in [18, 22] . A topological view on distributed computability issues in Byzantine asynchronous message-passing systems has been recently presented in [16, 28] . A pedagogical topology-based presentation of the BG-simulation is given in chapter 7 of [16] .
What is learned from the BG simulation The important lesson learned from the BG simulation is that, in a failure-prone context, what is important is not the number of processes but the maximal number of possible failures and the actual number of values that are proposed to a decision task. An interesting consequence of the BG simulation (among several of its applications [7] ) is the proof that there is no t-resilient (n, k)-set agreement algorithm for t ≥ k. This is obtained as follows. As (1) the BG simulation allows reducing the (k + 1, k)-set agreement problem to the (n, k)-set agreement problem in a system with up to k failures, and (2) the (k + 1, k)-set agreement problem is known to be impossible in presence of k failures [6, 19, 30] , it follows that there is no k-resilient (n, k)-set agreement algorithm.
Content of the paper: on the BG-simulation side As already indicated, the BG simulation has been explored in asynchronous systems where processes (1) communicate through atomic read/write registers [25] , and (2) may commit only crash failures. This paper extends it in two directions. The first is the communication model, namely, it considers that processes cooperate by sending and receiving messages via asynchronous reliable channels. The second dimension is related to the type of failures; more precisely, it considers two Content of the paper: on the safe agreement objects side The core of the previous algorithms lies in new underlying safe agreement objects, which allow the n simulators to agree on the next operation executed by each of the n simulated processes. Such a safe agreement object ensures that all the simulators produce the very same simulation. At the operational level, a safe agreement object provides processes with two operations, denoted propose() and decide(), which are invoked in this order by each correct process. The termination property associated with a safe agreement object SA is the following: if no simulator commits a failure while executing SA.propose(), then any invocation of SA.decide() by a non-faulty simulator terminates. Moreover, no two correct processes decide differently.
On the algorithmic side, a novelty of the paper lies in the algorithms implementing these new safe agreement objects. Differently from their read/write memory counterparts, they are not based on underlying snapshot objects [1] . They instead rely heavily on message communication patterns inspired from the reliable broadcast algorithms introduced in [8] .
A last and noteworthy contribution of the paper lies in the second algorithm (which implements safe agreement in a Byzantine message-passing system). This object is the core of a simulation when one wants to execute asynchronous read/write crash-tolerant algorithms on top of asynchronous message-passing systems prone to Byzantine failures.
Existing simulations considering Byzantine failures Simulations of crash failures in a Byzantine system have been addressed in the context of synchronous systems [5, 29, 31] . The only articles we are aware of concerning such a simulation in asynchronous systems are [12, 16, 20] . As noticed in [4] , [12] considers a restricted class of round-based deterministic algorithms. The simulation presented in [16] executes a fullinformation asynchronous crash-tolerant algorithm in an asynchronous Byzantine failure-prone system. The article [20] considers an agent/host model and focuses mainly on reliable broadcast.
Roadmap The paper is composed of 6 sections. Section 2 presents both the crash-prone and the Byzantine asynchronous message-passing models, and the notion of a task. Section 3 presents the structure of the simulation algorithms. Section 4 presents the simulation algorithm BG(MP,C), while Section 5 presents the simulation algorithm BG(MP,B). Finally, Section 6 addresses the computability implications of the Byzantinetolerant simulation and its underlying safe agreement object.
Computation Models and Tasks

Computation models
Computing entities The system is made up of a set Π of n sequential processes, denoted p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n . These processes are asynchronous in the sense that each process progresses at its own speed, which can be arbitrary and remains always unknown to the other processes.
During an execution, processes may deviate from their specification. In that case, the corresponding processes are said to be faulty. A process that does not deviate from its specification is correct (or non-faulty). The model parameter t denotes the maximal number of processes that can be faulty in a given execution. Two failure types are considered below.
Communication model The processes cooperate by sending and receiving messages through bi-directional channels. The communication network is a complete network, which means that each process p i can directly send a message to any process p j (including itself). Each channel is reliable (no loss, corruption, or creation of messages), not necessarily first-in/first-out, and asynchronous (while the transit time of each message is finite, there is no upper bound on message transit times).
The macro-operation "broadcast TYPE(m)", where TYPE is a message type and m is its content, is a shortcut for the following statement: "send TYPE(m) to each process (including itself)".
The process crash failure model In the crash failure model, a process may prematurely stop its execution. A process executes correctly its algorithm until it possibly crashes. Once crashed, a process remains crashed forever. It is assumed that at most t processes may crash. If there is no specific constraint on t, the corresponding model is denoted CAMP n,t [t < n]. When it is assumed that at most t < n/2 processes may crash, the corresponding model is denoted CAMP n,t [t < n/2].
The Byzantine failure model A Byzantine process is a process that behaves arbitrarily: it may crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send the same message m to all the processes, can send a message m 1 to some processes, a different message m 2 to another subset of processes, and no message at all to the other processes. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to "pollute" the computation.
It is assumed that Byzantine processes cannot control the network, hence, when a process receives a message, it can unambiguously identify its sender. As previously, t denotes the upper bound on the number of processes that may commit Byzantine failures. If there is no constraint on t, the corresponding model is denoted BAMP n,t [t < n]. When it is assumed that at most t < n/3 processes may be faulty, the corresponding model is denoted BAMP n,t [t < n/3].
Decision tasks and algorithms solving a task
Decision tasks The problems we are interested in are called decision tasks (the reader interested in a more formal presentation of decision tasks can consult the literature, e.g., [7, 19] ). In every run, each process proposes a value and the proposed values define an input vector I, where I[j] is the value proposed by process p j . Let I denote the set of allowed input vectors. Each process has to decide a value. The decided values define an output vector O, such that O[j] is the value decided by p j . Let O be the set of the output vectors.
A decision task is a binary relation ∆ from I into O. A task is colorless if, when a value v is proposed by a process p j (i.e., I[j] = v), then v can be proposed by any number of processes and, when a value v is decided by a process p j (i.e., O[j] = v ), then v can be decided by any number of processes. Consensus, and more generally k-set agreement, are colorless tasks. Otherwise the task is colored. Symmetry breaking and renaming are colored tasks [3, 10, 21] .
Algorithm solving a task An algorithm solves a task in a t-resilient environment if, given any I ∈ I, (1) each correct process p j decides a value o j , and (2) there is an output vector O such that (I, O) ∈ ∆ where O is defined as follows. If
Considering a system of n processes, a task is t-resiliently solvable if there is an algorithm that solves it in the presence of at most t faulty processes. As an example, consensus is not 1-resiliently solvable in asynchronous crash-prone systems, be the communication medium a set of read/write registers [27] , or a message-passing system [13] . Differently, renaming with 2n − 1 new names is (n − 1)-resiliently solvable in asynchronous read/write crash-prone systems [9, 19] , and is t-resiliently solvable in asynchronous crashprone message-passing systems for t < n/2 [3] .
Structure of the Simulation Algorithms
Aim Let A be an algorithm that solves a colorless decision task among n processes in the system model CAMP n ,t [t < n ]. The aim is to design an algorithm that simulates A in the system model CAMP n,t [t < n/2] (resp., BAMP n,t [t < n/3]). As already indicated, the corresponding simulation algorithm is denoted BG(MP,C) in the first case, and BG(MP,B) in the second case.
Notation A simulated process is denoted p j , where 1 ≤ j ≤ n . Similarly, a simulator process ("simulator" in short') is denoted q i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The set Π denote the set of the simulator indexes, i.e., Π = {1, ..., n}.
The safe agreement objects, build in the simulation and used by the simulators, are identified with upper case letters, e.g., SA. The variables local to simulator q j is identified with lower case letters, and the resulting identifiers are subscripted with j.
Behavior of a simulator q i Each simulator is given the code of all the simulated processes p 1 , ..., p n . It manages n threads, one associated with each simulated process, and executes them in a fair way.
The code of a simulated process p j contains local statements, send statements, and receive statements. It is assumed that the behavior of a simulated process p j is deterministic in the sense it is entirely defined from its local input (as defined by the task instance), and the order in which p j receives messages.
The simulation has to ensure that (1) all simulators simulate the same behavior of the set of simulated processes, and (2) a faulty simulator entails the failure of at most one simulated process. The way this is realized depends, of course, on the failure model that is considered.
BG(MP,C): BG in the Crash-prone Asynchronous Message-Passing Model
This section presents the algorithm BG(MP,C). As previously indicated, this algorithm simulates, in the model CAMP n,t [t < n/2], an algorithm A solving a task in CAMP n ,t [t < n ]. It is made up of two parts: an algorithm implementing a safe agreement object, and the simulation itself, which uses several of these objects to allow the simulators to cooperate.
Safe agreement object in
This object type (or variants of it), briefly sketched in the Introduction, is at the core of both the BG simulation [6, 7, 14, 22] , and the liveness guarantees of concurrent objects [23, 24] . It is a one-shot object that solves consensus in failure-free scenarios, and allows processes to agree with a weak termination guarantee in the presence of failures.
A safe agreement object provides each simulator q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with two operations denoted propose() and decide(), that q i can invoke at most once, and in this order; propose() allows q i to propose a value, while decide() allows it to decide a value. Considering the crash failure model, the properties associated with this object are the following ones.
• Validity. A decided value is a proposed value.
• Agreement. No two simulators decide distinct values.
• Propose-Termination. An invocation of propose() by a correct simulator terminates.
• Decide-Termination. If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), then any invocation of decide() by a correct simulator terminates.
It is easy to see that a safe agreement object is a consensus object whose termination condition is failuredependent. Algorithms implementing safe agreement objects (or variants of it) can be found in [6, 7, 24] .
4.2 Safe agreement object in CAMP n,t [t < n/2]: algorithm An algorithm implementing a safe agreement object in CAMP n,t [t < n/2] is described in Figure 1 .
Local data structures Each simulator q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, manages three local data structures, namely, the arrays
, where ⊥ denotes a default value that cannot be proposed to the safe agreement object by the simulators.
• The aim of values i [x] is to contain, as currently known by q i , the value proposed to the safe agreement object by the simulator q x .
• The aim of my_view i [x] is to contain, as known by q i , the value proposed to the safe agreement object by the simulator q x , as witnessed by strictly more than n 2 distinct simulators (i.e., at least a correct process).
• The aim of all_views i [x] is to contain what to q i 's knows about the view seen by q x .
Algorithm: the operation propose() The algorithm implementing the operation propose() invoked by a simulator q i is described at lines C01-C14 (client side) and lines C20-C22 (server side). This algorithm is made up of three parts.
First part. A simulator q i first broadcasts the message VALUE (i, v i ), where v i is the value it proposes to the safe agreement object (line C01). Then, it waits until it knows that strictly more than n 2 simulators know its value (line C02). On its "server" side, when q i receives for the first time the message VALUE (x, v), it first saves v in values i [x] ; then it forwards the received message to cope with the (possible) crash of q x (this witnesses the fact that q i knows the value proposed by p x , line C20) 1 ).
wait READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥) received from strictly more than n 2 different simulators (C06) ∨ ∃ w : VALUE (x, w) received from strictly more than
; (C17) let min_σi be the set σ of smallest size; (C18) let res be min({valuesi[y] : y ∈ min_σi}); (C19) return(res).
is received for the first time:
% "for the first time" is with respect to each pair of values
when the message READ (j, x) is received for the first time: Second part. In this part, q i builds a local view of the values proposed by the n simulators. To this end, it first broadcasts messages READ (i, x), 1 ≤ x ≤ n, to learn the value proposed by each simulator q x (line C03). On its server side, when q i receives such a message, it broadcasts by return its current knowledge of the value proposed by q x (line C21).
Then, the simulator q i builds its local view of the values that have been proposed. For each simulator q x , q i waits until it has received from strictly more than n 2 distinct simulators the very same message, namely, either the message READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥), or the message VALUE (x, w) (lines C05-C06). In the first case, q i considers that q x has not yet proposed a value, while in the second case it considers that q x proposed the value w (let us observe that, while q i can receive both READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥) and messages VALUE (x, w), it stops waiting as soon as it received strictly more than n 2 of one of them) (lines C07-C10). Third part. Finally, the simulator q i informs the other simulators on its local view my_view i [1..n]. To this end, it broadcasts the message VIEW (i, my_view i ). When it has received the corresponding "acknowledgments", q i returns from its invocation of the operation propose() (line C12-C14). (The behavior of q i when it 1 Let us observe that the lines C01 and C20 implement a reliable broadcast of the message VALUE (i, vi). Similarly, the lines C12 and C22 implement a reliable broadcast of the message VIEW (i, my_viewi). It is easy to see that the cost of such a reliable broadcast is O(n 2 ) messages. Algorithm: the operation decide() The algorithm implementing the operation decide() is described at lines C15-C19. It consists in a "closure" computation. A simulator q i waits until it knows a non-empty set of simulators σ such that (a) it knows their views, and (b) this set is closed under the relation "has in its published view the value of" which means that the processes whose values appear in a view of a process of σ are also in σ (lines C15-C16). Let us observe that it is possible that, locally, several sets satisfy this property. If it is the case, q i selects the smallest of them. Let min_σ i be this set of simulators (lines C17). The value that is returned by q i is then the smallest value among the the values proposed by the simulators in min_σ i (lines C18-C19).
This section proves that the algorithm presented in Figure 1 implements a safe agreement object, i.e., any of its runs in CAMP n,t [t < n/2] satisfies the validity, agreement, and termination properties, which define it. Lemma 1. An invocation of propose() by a simulator that does not crash during this invocation, terminates.
Proof Let us consider a simulator q i that does not crash during its invocation of propose(). Hence, q i broadcast the message VALUE (i, v i ) at line C01. This message is received by strictly more than n 2 correct simulators, and each of them broadcasts this message when it receives it. It follows that q i cannot block forever at line C02.
Let us now consider the wait statement at lines C05-C06. There are two cases. Let READ (i, x) be a message broadcast by the simulator q i at line C03.
• Case 1: No correct simulator ever receives a message VALUE (x, −). In this case, each correct simulator q y is such that values y [x] remains always equal to ⊥. It follows that, when q y receives the message READ (i, x), it sends back to q i the message READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥) (line C21). As there are strictly more than n 2 correct simulators, q i eventually receives the message READ'ANSWER (i, x, ⊥) from strictly more than n 2 different simulators, and the predicate of line C05 is then satisfied.
• Case 2: At least one correct simulator q y receives a message VALUE (x, v). In this case, q y broadcasts the message VALUE (x, v) when it receives it (line C20). It follows from the broadcasts issued at this line that q i eventually receives VALUE (x, v) from strictly more than n 2 different simulators. When this occurs, the predicate of line C06 is satisfied, and q i exits the wait statement.
As this is true for any message READ (i, x) broadcast by the simulator q i at line C03, it follows that q i cannot remain block forever at lines C05-C06.
Let us finally consider the lines C12-C13. As the message VIEW (i, my_view i ) broadcast by q i at line C12 is received by at least all the correct processes, and each of them broadcast it when it receives it for the first time, it follows that q i receives the message VIEW (i, my_view i ) from strictly more than n 2 distinct processes, and stops waiting at line C13, which concludes the proof of the lemma.
2 Lemma 1
Lemma 2. The value returned by an invocation of propose() is a value that was proposed by a simulator.
Proof Let us observe that (due to its definition) the set min_σ is non-empty, and (due the first predicate of line C06) the simulator indexes y it contains are such that values i [y] = ⊥. As, for any of those y, values i [y] is set to a non-⊥ value (only once) at line C20, it follows that q i received a message VALUE (y, v y ). Proof Let us first observe that, due to the reliable broadcast of the messages VALUE () (lines C01 and C20) and VIEW () (lines C12 and C22), and the fact that a simulator broadcast a single message VALUE (), we have:
Let us assume, by contradiction, that two simulators q i and q j decide different values. This means that the sets min_σ i min_σ j computed at line C17 by q i and q j , respectively, are different.
Since min_σ i and min_σ j are different, let us consider z ∈ min_σ i \ min_σ j (if min_σ i min_σ j , swap i and j). According to the closure predicate used at line C16, as z / ∈ min_σ j , we have ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views j [y][z] = ⊥. It follows that any simulator q y such that y ∈ min_σ j does not fulfill the condition of line C07 for x = z. Consequently, q y received at line C05 a message READ'ANSWER(y, z, ⊥) from a set of simulators Q y,r(z) of size strictly greater than n 2 . Consequently when q y executed line C03 for
When the simulator q z stops waiting at line C02, it received messages VALUE(z,v z ) (where v z is the value sent by q z at line C01) from a set Q z,w of strictly more than n 2 simulators. It follows that Q y,r(z) ∩ Q z,w = ∅, consequently there is a simulator q k that sent a message READ'ANSWER(y, z, ⊥) to q y and a message VALUE(z,v z ) to q z . Since value k [z] is never reset to ⊥ after being assigned, the simulator q y necessarily executed line C03 for x = z strictly before q z stops waiting at line C02. Consequently q y stopped waiting at line C02 before q z executes line C03 for x = y. It does so after receiving messages VALUE(y,v y ) (where v y is the value sent by q y at line C01) from a set Q y,w of strictly more than n 2 simulators q k , and each of these simulators then verifies values k = v y . These simulators do not send READ'ANSWER(z, y, ⊥) messages when they receive the READ(z, y) message sent by q z . Thus, it is impossible that q z receives these messages from strictly more than n 2 processes, it consequently cannot verify the predicate of line C05. It follows that q z executes line C12 with my_view z [y] = v y = ⊥ and this entails that ∀k ∈ Π :
According to the predicate of line C16, this entails that y ∈ min_σ i , and since the previous reasoning holds for any y ∈ min_σ j , it shows that min_σ j ⊆ min_σ i . It follows that, when q i executes line C17, ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views i [y] = ⊥ and, consequently, ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views i [y] = all_views j [y]. It entails that if |min_σ j | < |min_σ i |, then min_σ j would have been chosen by q i at line C17, which proves that min_σ i = min_σ j and contradicts the fact that q i and q j decide differently.
2 Lemma 3 Lemma 4. If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), then any invocation of decide() by a correct simulator terminates.
Proof If no simulator crashes while executing propose(), it follows from Lemma 1 that every simulator q i that invokes propose() broadcasts a message VALUE (i, v i ) at line C01 and a message VIEW (i, my_views i ) at line C12. Assuming no simulator crashes while executing propose(), let P be the set of simulators that invoke propose(), and suppose that one of them, q i , invoke decide() and never terminates. This can only happen if q i waits forever for the condition of lines C15-C16 to be fulfilled. Since eventually the messages broadcast by the simulators of P are all delivered to q i , after some finite time ∀y ∈ P : all_views i [y] = ⊥. Moreover, since the views broadcast by the simulators of P are built at line C08 from the messages VALUE (−,−) they receive, it follows that these views can contain non-⊥ values only for the entries corresponding to the simulators of P (the simulators that are not in P do not sent messages VALUE(−,−)). Consequently, p i eventually verifies ∀y ∈ P : (all_views
It follows that the property of lines C15-C16 is eventually true for σ = P , which contradicts the fact that q i never terminates its decide() operation.
2 Lemma 4 Theorem 1. The algorithm in Figure 1 implements a safe agreement object in CAMP n,t [t < n/2].
Proof The proof follows from Lemma 1 (Propose-Termination), Lemma 2 (Validity), Lemma 3 (Agreement), and Lemma 4 (Decide-Termination).
2 Theorem 1
Simulation algorithm
The simulation algorithm takes as input a distributed algorithm A solving a (colorless) task in the system model CAMP n ,t [t < n ], and simulates it in CAMP n,t [t < n/2]. Each simulator q i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is given a copy of the n processes of A, and a private input vector input i [1.
.n ], with one input per simulated processes p j . The simulation consists in a fair simulation by each of the n simulators q i of the n simulated processes p j . To that end, each simulator manages n threads (each simulating a process p j ), and the n threads associated with the simulation of a process p j cooperate through safe agreement objects.
Objects shared by the simulators To produce a consistent simulation, for each simulated process p j , the n simulators have to agree on the same sequence of the messages received by p j . To that end, they use an array of safe agreement objects, denoted SA[1..n , −], such that SA[j, sn] allows them to agree on the sn-th message received by the n threads simulating p j at each simulator q i .
Objects managed by each simulator q i Each simulator manages the following data structures, with respect to each simulated process p j .
• input i [j] contains the input of the simulated process p j , proposed by the simulator q i . (Simulators are allowed to propose different input vectors for the simulated processes).
• sn i [j] is the sequence number (from the simulation point of view) of the next message received by the simulated process p j .
• sent i [j] is a sequence containing messages sent by the simulated processes to the simulated process p j . It is assumed that the n threads of q i access sent i [j] in mutual exclusion (when they add messages to or withdraw messages from this sequence). The symbol ⊕ is used to add messages at the end of a sequence. Sometimes sent i [j] is used as a set.
• received i [j] is a set containing the messages received by the simulated process p j (init. ∅).
• state i [j] contains the current local state of the simulated process p j .
It is assumed that the behavior of each simulated process p j is described by a deterministic transition function In addition to the previous local data, each simulator q i uses a starvation-free mutual exclusion lock, whose operations are denoted mutex_in i () and mutex_out i (). This lock is used to ensure that, at any time, at most one of the n threads of q i access a safe agreement object. This is to guarantee that the crash of a simulator q i entails the crash of at most one simulated process p j (line 09). More precisely, if q i crashes while executing SA[j, sn].propose.(), it can block forever only the invocations of SA[j, sn].decide.(), issued by the other simulators, thereby preventing the simulation of p j from terminating. 
The simulation algorithm The algorithm describing the simulation of a process p j by the associated thread of the simulator q i is presented in Figure 2 .
The simulators have first to agree on the same input for process p j . To this end, they use the safe agreement object SA[j, 0] (lines 01-02). Moreover, when considering all the simulated processes, it follows from the mutual exclusion lock that, whatever the number of simulated processes, a simulator q i is engaged in at most one invocation of propose() at a time. Then, according to the decided input of p j , q i locally simulate p j until it invokes a message reception (lines 03-04).
After this initialization, each simulator q i enters a loop whose aim is to locally simulate p j . To this end, q i first determines the message that p j will receive; this message is saved in rec_msg and added to received i [j] (lines 07-12). When this message has been determined, q i simulates the behavior of p j until its next message reception (lines [13] [14] . Finally, if state i [j] allows p j to decide a value with respect to the simulated decision task, this value is decided (lines 15-17).
Proof of the simulation
The reader interested in a formal definition of the term simulation -as used here-will consult [7] .
Lemma 5. The crash of a simulator q i entails the crash of at most one simulated process p j .
Proof
The only places where a simulator q i can block is during the invocation of the safe agreement operation decide(). Such invocations appear at line 02, and line 11. It follows from the termination property of the safe agreement objects that such an invocation can block forever the invoking process only if a simulator crashes during the invocation of the operation propose() on the same object. But, due to the mutual exclusion lock used at line 01 and line 10, a simulator can be engaged in at most one invocation of propose at a time. It follows that the crash of a simulation q i can entail the definitive halting (crash) of at most one simulated process p j .
2 Lemma 5 Lemma 6. The simulation of the reception of the k-th message received by a simulated process p j , returns the same message at all simulators.
Proof The simulation of the message receptions for a simulated process p j , are executed at each simulator q i at lines 08-11, and all the simulators use the same sequence of sequence numbers (line 07 Proof The only non-deterministic elements of the simulation are the input vectors input i [1.
.n ] at each simulator q i , and the reception of the simulated messages.
The lines 01-02 of the simulation force the simulators to agree on the same input value for each simulated process p j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n . Similarly, as shown by Lemma 6, for each simulated process p j , the lines 07-11 direct the simulators to agree on the very same sequence of messages received by p j . It follows from the fact that the function δ j () is deterministic, that any two simulators q i and q k , that execute lines 15-16 during the same "round number"
, from which the lemma follows.
2 Lemma 7 Lemma 8. The sequences of message receptions simulated by each simulator q i on behalf of each simulated process p j , define a correct execution of the simulated algorithm.
Proof To prove the correctness of the simulation, we have to show that 1. Every message that was sent by a simulated process to another simulated process (whose simulation is not blocked either), is received, and 2. The simulated messages respect a simulated physical order (i.e., no message is "received" before being "sent").
Item 1 is satisfied because the messages sent by the simulated process p j to the simulated process p k are received (lines 09-11) in their sending order (as defined at line 04 and line 14). Hence, if p k is not blocked (due to the crash of a simulator) it obtains the messages from p j in their sending order.
For Item 2, let us define a (simulated) physical order as follows. For each simulated message m, let us consider the first time at which the reception of m was simulated (i.e., this occurs when -for the first time-a simulator terminates the invocation of SA[−, −].decide() that returns m). A message that is decided has been proposed by a simulator to a safe agreement object before being decided (validity property).The sending time of a simulated message is defined as the first time at which SA[−, −].propose(m) is invoked by a simulator. It follows that any simulated message is sent before being received, which concludes the lemma. 2 Lemma 8 Lemma 9. Each correct simulator q i computes the decision value of at least (n − t) simulated processes.
Proof Due to Lemma 5, and the fact that at most t simulators may crash, it follows that at most t simulated processes may be prevented from progressing. As (a) by assumption the simulated algorithm A is t-resilient, and (b) due to Lemma 8 the simulation produces a correct simulation of A , it follows that at least (n − t) simulated processes decide a value.
2 Lemma 9
Theorem 2. Let A be an algorithm solving a decision task in CAMP n ,t [t < n ]. The algorithm described in Figure 2 is a correct simulation of A in CAMP n,t [t < n/2].
Proof The theorem follows from Lemma 8 and Lemma 9. This section presents an algorithm, denoted BG(MP,B), which implements the BG simulation in the Byzantine asynchronous message-passing model BAMP n,t [t < n/3]. To this end, an appropriate safe agreement object is first built, and then used by the simulation algorithm.
From crash failures to Byzantine behaviors
The idea is to extend the algorithm of Figure 1 to obtain an algorithm that copes with Byzantine simulators. The main issues that have to be solved are the following.
• The simulators need a mechanism to control the validity of the inputs to the safe agreement objects.
(See below for the notion of a valid value.)
• The simulators must be able to check if a given simulator q i is participating in more than one operation propose() at the same time (on the same or several safe agreement objects). If it is the case, q i is faulty and its definitive stop can block forever several simulated processes. Hence, such a faulty simulator has to be ignored.
To solve these issues, each safe agreement object may no longer be considered as a separate abstraction: each new instance depends on the previous ones. This is captured in the following specification customized to the Byzantine model, and, at the operational level, in the predicate valid() used in the algorithm implementing the operation propose().
Safe agreement in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]: definition
To cope with the previous observations, the fact that a faulty process may decide an arbitrary value, and the fact that the safe agreement objects are used to solve specific problems (a simulation in our case), the specification of the safe agreement object is reshaped as follows.
A value proposed by a process to a safe agreement object must be valid. At each correct simulator q i , the validity of a value is captured by a predicate denoted valid i (j, v) where v is the value and q j the simulator that proposed it. This predicate is made up of two parts (defined in Section 5.3 and Section 5.6, respectively). If q j is correct, the predicate valid i (j, v) eventually returns true at p i . If q j is faulty, valid i (j, v) returns true at p i only if (a) the value v could have been proposed by a correct simulator and (b) to q i 's knowledge, q j does not participate concurrently in several invocations of propose().
• Validity. If a correct simulator q i decides the value v, there is a correct simulator q j such that valid j (−, v).
(v was validated by a correct simulator.)
• Agreement. No two correct simulators decide distinct values.
• Propose-Termination. Any invocation of propose() by a correct simulator terminates.
• Decide-Termination. The invocations by all the correct simulators of decide() on all the safe agreement objects terminate, except for at most t safe agreement objects.
Safe agreement in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]: algorithm
The local variables
.n], and the algorithm implementing the operation decide() are the same as in Figure 1 (lines C15-C19). The new algorithm implementing the operation propose(), and the processing of the associated messages, are described in Figure 3 and Figure 4 . This implementation uses an additional local array answers i [1.
.n][1.
.n], all entries of which are initialized to "?". The meaning of "
(where v is a proposed value or ⊥) is the following: to the knowledge of q i , the simulator q k answered value v when it received the message READ(j, x) sent by q j . (A simulator q j broadcasts such a message when it needs to know the value proposed by the simulator q x ; ⊥ means that q k does not know this value yet.) This means that, from q i 's point of view, the value proposed by q x , as known by q k when it received the request by q j , is v.
Lemma 10. Any two sets of simulators Q 1 and Q 2 of more than n+t 2 elements have at least one correct simulator in their intersection.
Proof As we consider integers, "strictly more than n+t 2 " is equivalent to "at least n+t 2 + 1".
•
It follows that Q 1 ∩ Q 2 contains at least one correct simulator.
2 Lemma 10 The fact that, despite Byzantine processes, the intersection of any two simulator sets of size greater than n+t 2 have at least one correct simulator in common, is used in many places in the algorithm. This property will be used in the proof to show that the local views of the correct processes are mutually consistent.
The operation propose() The client side of the algorithm implementing the operation propose() is described in Figure 3 ; its server side is described in Figure 4 . The client side algorithm is very close to the one of the crash failure case (Figure 1 ). They differ in two points.
• The message tags VALUE and VIEW (used at lines C02, C06, and C13 in Figure 1 ) are replaced in Figure 3 by the tags VALUE'ACK and VIEW'ACK, respectively. The role of these message tags is explained below.
• The predicate of line B05 is replaced by the predicate |{k :
. This predicate states that more than n+t 2 simulators answered ⊥ to the request message READ(i, x) broadcast by q i , (i.e., they did not know the value proposed by q x when they received the read request). when the message VALUE'VALID (j, v) is received:
when the message VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) is received:
-------------------------------------------------
when the message READ (j, x) is received from qj for the first time:
when the message READ'ANSWER (j, x, v) is received from q k for the first time:
when the message READ'ANSWER'WITNESS (k, j, x, v) is received:
when the message VIEW (j, view) is received from qj for the first time:
when the message VIEW'WITNESS (j, view) is received: On its server side, when a simulator q i receives a message VALUE (j, v), it first checks if this message is valid (line B15). If the message is valid, q i broadcasts (echoes) the message VALUE'VALID (j, v) to inform the other simulators that it agrees to take into account the pair (j, v) (line B15).
When the simulator p i has received the message VALUE'VALID (j, v) from more than n+t 2 simulators, it broadcasts the message VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) to inform the other processes that at least n+t 2 − t = n−t 2 ≥ t + 1 correct simulators, have validated the pair (j, v).
When q i has received the message VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) from (t + 1) simulators (i.e., from at least one correct simulator) it broadcasts this message, if not yet done (lines B18-B20). This is to prevent invocations of propose() from blocking forever (while waiting VALUE'ACK (j, v) messages at line B02, B06, B24 or B38), because not enough VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) messages have been broadcast 2 . Then, if q i has received the message VALUE'WITNESS (j, v) from more than n+t 2 simulators, it takes v into account (writes it into values i [j]) and sends an acknowledgment to q j (lines B21-B23). The corresponding message VALUE'ACK (j, v) broadcast by q i will also inform the other simulators that q i took into account the value v proposed by q j . Hence, this message will help q j progress at line B02, and all correct simulators progress at line B06.
First part of the predicate valid i (j, v) As already indicated, the aim of this predicate is to help a simulator q i detect if the value v proposed by the simulator q j is valid. It is always satisfied when q j is correct, and it can return true or f alse when q j is faulty. It is made up of two sub-predicates P 1 and P 2.
• The first sub-predicate P 1 checks if, for the messages VALUE (j, −) (from q j ) and VALUE'VALID (j, −)
(from more than t + 1 different simulators) that q i has received for other safe agreement objects, q i has also received the associated messages VIEW'WITNESS (j, −) from at least (n − t) different simulators. This allows q i to check if the simulator q j is not simultaneously participating in other invocations of propose() on other safe agreement objects.
• The aim of the second sub-predicate P 2 (defined in Section 5.6 and used in the simulation) is to allow the simulators to check that the simulation is consistent. As the present section considers safe agreement objects independently from its use in the simulation, we consider, for now, that P 2 is always satisfied.
If the full predicate valid i (j, v) is never satisfied, q i will, collectively with the other correct simulators, prevent the faulty simulator q j from progressing with respect to the corresponding safe agreement object.
Messages READ(), READ'ANSWER() and READ'ANSWER'WITNESS() After the value v i it proposes to the safe agreement object has been taken into account by When q i receives the message READ (j, x) from the simulator q j , it first waits until it knows that the value proposed by q j is known by more than n+t 2 simulators (line B24). This is to check that q j broadcast its proposed value before reading the other simulator values used to build its own view. When this occurs, q i answers the message READ (j, x) by broadcasting the message READ'ANSWSER (j, x, values i [x]) to inform all the simulators on what it currently knows on the value proposed by q x (line B26). (Let us remind that, in the crash failure model, q i was sending this message only to q j .)
When it receives the message READ'ANSWER (j, x, v) from a simulator q k , if not yet done, q i broadcasts the message READ'ANSWSER'WITNESS (k, j, x, v). The lines B27-B31 implement a reliable broadcast [8] , i.e., the message READ'ANSWSER'WITNESS (k, j, x, v) is received by all correct processes or none of them, and is always received if the sender is correct. The reliable reception of this message entails the assignment of answer i [k, j, x] to v (line B33).
Messages VIEW(), VIEW'WITNESS() and VIEW'ACK() Finally, as in Figure 1 , the simulator q i broadcasts its local view of proposed values to all simulators, waits until more than n+t 2 of them sent back an acknowledgment, and returns from the invocation of propose() (lines B12-B14).
When q i receives for the first time the message VIEW (j, view), it realizes an enriched reliable broadcast whose aim is to assign view to all_view i Finally, when q i receives a message VIEW'WITNESS (j, view), it does the following. First, if it has received this message from at least one correct simulator, and has not yet broadcast it, q i does it (lines B44-B46). This part of the reliable broadcast is to prevent the correct simulators from blocking forever. Then, if it has received VIEW'WITNESS (j, view) from more than n+t 2 simulators and has not yet assigned a value to all_view i [j], q i does it and sends to q j the acknowledgment message VIEW'ACK (j, view) to inform q j that it knows its view (lines B47-B49).
A communication pattern
When considering the algorithm of Figure 4 , it appears that the processing of the messages VALUE'WITNESS () (lines B18-B23), READ'ANSWER'WITNESS () (lines B28-B34), and VIEW'WITNESS () (lines B44-B49), follow the same generic pattern. This pattern, inspired from [8] and where WITNESS is used as message tag, is described in Figure 5 .
then execute statement A (GP07) end if. Proof Proof of (i). Let p i be a correct process that executes A. It follows from line GP05 that it has received the message WITNESS (m) from more than n+t 2 different simulators. As n > 3t, n+t 2 + 1 ≥ 2t + 1, p i received the message WITNESS (m) from at least (t + 1) correct simulators. It then follows from lines GP01-GP02 that all correct simulators broadcast WITNESS (m) and, consequently, each correct simulator receives WITNESS (m) from at least (n − t) simulators. The proof follows from n − t > n+t 2 . Proof of (ii). If (t+1) correct simulators broadcast WITNESS (m), the predicate of line GP01 is eventually satisfied at every correct simulator. As As n − t > n+t 2 , it follows that the predicate of line GP05 will also be satisfied at each correct simulator, which concludes the proof.
2 Theorem 3
Safe agreement object in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]: proof
This section proves that the algorithm presented in Figures 3 and 4 implements a safe agreement object in the presence of Byzantine simulators, i.e., any of its runs in BAMP n,t [t < n/3] satisfies the validity, agreement, and termination properties that define this object.
Propose-termination
Lemma 11. Let q i be a correct simulator. If the predicate valid j (i, v i ) eventually becomes satisfied at the correct simulators q j , then the invocation of propose(v i ) by q i terminates.
Proof A correct simulator q i can be blocked forever in a wait statement (1) at line B02, (2) at lines B05-B06, or (3) at line B13. We show that, if the predicate valid j (i, v i ) is eventually satisfied at the correct simulators q j , p i cannot block forever in the invocation of propose(v i ).
• wait instruction at line B02. Simulator q i first broadcasts the message VALUE(i, v i ) (line B01), then waits for VALUE'ACK messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators. When a correct simulator q j receives VALUE(i, v i ) for the first time, it waits until valid j (i, v i ) becomes satisfied. By assumption, this happens. Simulator q j then broadcasts VALUE'VALID(i, v i ). It follows that each of the at least (n − t) correct simulators broadcasts the message VALUE'VALID(i, v i ).
As n − t > n+t 2 , it follows that each correct simulator q j receives the message VALUE'VALID(i, v i ) from more than • wait instruction at lines B05-B06.
In this waiting statement, q i waits until either |{k :
becomes true, or until it receives VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators.
-If q j is a correct simulator that invoked propose(j, w), the reasoning is the same as above. Consequently, q i will receive VALUE'ACK(j, w) from at least n − t > n+t 2 different simulators. -If q j is faulty or never invokes propose(j, w), q i may never receive VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators. We will show that, in this case, the wait predicate |{k :
We first show that, if a correct simulator receives VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators, then all correct simulators do receive VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators. If a correct simulator receives VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than n+t 2 different simulators, at least (t + 1) correct simulators broadcast it. Every correct simulator will then receive the message VALUE'ACK(j, w) from at least (t + 1) different simulators and, if not already done, broadcasts it (lines B24-B25). All correct simulators will then receive the message VALUE'ACK(j, w) from at least n − t > n+t 2 different simulators.
According to the previous observation, let us consider the case in which no correct simulator ever receives the message VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than When a correct simulator receives a READ(i, j) message from q i , it waits until it has received VALUE'ACK(i, v i ) messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators (line B24). The reasoning above (first item) shows that this will eventually become true.
Every correct simulator q k will then broadcast READ'ANSWER(i, j, ⊥). This will cause all correct simulators to broadcast mess sages READ'ANSWER'WITNESS(k, i, j, ⊥), which will be received by the simulator q i . This will then assign ⊥ to
Consequently, it will not remain blocked at lines B05-B06.
• wait instruction at line B13.
As simulator q i broadcasts its view with a message VIEW(i, view) (line B12), every correct simulator checks if this view is consistent when it receives it (lines B36-B41). Let us first consider the entries view[j] such that view[j] = w = ⊥. This means that q i has received VALUE'ACK(j, w) from more than All the correct simulators will then broadcast the message VIEW'WITNESS(i, view) (line B42). By Theorem 3, they will all send VIEW'ACK(i, view) to q i . This will allow q i to terminate its invocation of propose(i, v i ), which concludes the proof of the lemma.
2 Lemma 11 Lemma 12. Let v 1 , . . . , v x , . . . be the values proposed by a correct simulator q i to a sequence of safe agreement objects. If q i does not invoke propose() operations concurrently and valid j (i, v x ) is eventually satisfied at every correct simulator q j , then valid j (i, v x+1 ) is also eventually satisfied at q j .
Proof We consider here that the sub-predicate P 2 is always satisfied, and thus consider only the sub-predicate P 1. Let us recall that P 1 states that, for every message VALUE(i, −) that q j received from q i , and for every message VALUE'VALID(i, −) that q j received from at least t + 1 different simulators, it has also received the corresponding messages VIEW'WITNESS(i, −). By hypothesis, valid j (i, v x ) is eventually satisfied at the correct simulator q j . Once q i broadcasts the message VALUE(i, v x ), q j only needs to receive the corresponding VIEW'WITNESS(i, view) for P 1 to be satisfied. By Lemma 11, q i terminates its invocation of propose(i, v x ), from which we conclude that it received VIEW'ACK(i, view) from more than n+t 2 different simulators (line B13). A correct simulator sends such a message only if it has received VIEW'WITNESS(i, view) from more than n+t 2 different simulators (lines B47-B48). According to Theorem 3, all the correct simulators also broadcast it (lines B44-B45). The correct simulator q j then receives them from more than n+t 2 different simulators. The predicate valid j (i, v x+1 ) is then eventually satisfied at q j .
2 Lemma 12 Decide-termination Lemma 13. If a correct simulator terminates its invocation of decide(), then all correct simulators terminate their invocation of decide().
Proof Suppose, by way of contradiction, that the invocation of decide() by a correct simulator q i terminates, and that the invocation of decide() by another correct simulator q j does not. The invocation of decide() by q i can terminate only if the predicate at lines C15-C16 is satisfied. Let q k be any simulator in the set σ defined at line C15. We show that all_views i [k] = view implies that we eventually have all_views j [k] = view, and thus that q j must decide.
Simulator q i assigns view to all_views i [k] at line B48. This can happen only because q i received VIEW'WITNESS(k, view) messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators. According to Theorem 3, q j eventually receives enough VIEW'WITNESS(k, view) messages and also assigns view to all_views j [k]. Simulator q j will then also have to decide.
2 Lemma 13 Lemma 14. The invocations of decide() by all the correct simulators on all the safe agreement objects terminate, except for at most t safe agreement objects.
Proof Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there are t + 1 safe agreement objects such that at least one correct simulator never terminates its invocation of decide(). By Lemma 13, there must be (t + 1) different safe agreement objects in which no correct simulator terminates its invocations of decide().
The invocation of the decide() operation by a correct simulator q i on a safe agreement object can only be blocked at lines C15-C16, if the corresponding predicate is never satisfied. This can happen if (1) We then consider case (2) .
Case (2) can happen if q z starts an invocation of propose() and communicates its proposed value to other processes, but does not terminate its invocation by communicating its view. Because there are at most t faulty simulators, by the pigeonhole principle, there must be a faulty simulator q z that prevents q i from deciding on two different safe agreement objects.
A correct simulator q k broadcasts a VALUE'VALID(z, −) after receiving a VALUE(z, −) message only if the predicate valid k (z, −) is satisfied (line B15). Due to the predicate valid k (z, −), this is true only if q k received VIEW'WITNESS(z, −) messages from at least (n − t) different simulators, each of these messages corresponding to the all the VALUE(z, −) and VALUE'VALID(z, −) messages that it has previously received (see the definition of the predicate P 1 of valid k (z, −)).
Let propose(v 1 ) be the invocation of propose() by q z on the first safe agreement object on which q i is blocked, and propose(v 2 ) the one on the second safe agreement object on which q i is blocked. Because there is a simulator q y ∈ σ such that all_views i [y] = ⊥ in the two invocations of decide() by q i , in both cases, more than In order to broadcast a VALUE'WITNESS(z, −) message, a correct simulator must either (a) receive VALUE'WITNESS(z, −) messages from at least t+1 different simulators (line B18), or (b) receive VALUE'VALID(z, −) messages from more than According to Lemma 10, there is a least one correct simulator q that broadcasts both VALUE'VALID(z, −) messages (line B15). In order to do so, the predicate valid (z, v 2 ) must have been verified at the time that q broadcast the VALUE'VALID(z, v 2 ) message. It must then have received the VIEW'WITNESS(z, view) messages that correspond to v 1 from more than n+t 2 different simulators. According to Theorem 3, q i must then also have received these messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators and assigned view to all_views i [z] (line B48) in the instance that corresponds to the invocation of propose(v 1 ) by q z , a contradiction that concludes the proof of the lemma. Suppose that there exists a value v = v such that there is a correct simulator q that assigns v to values [x] . Suppose that q is the first process to do so. It follows that q received VALUE'WITNESS (x, v ) messages from strictly more than n+t 2 different processes (line B21 or line B24). Consider the first correct simulator that broadcasts a VALUE'WITNESS (x, v ) message. In order to do so, it must have received VALUE'VALID (x, v ) messages from strictly more than n+t 2 different processes (lines B16-B17). However, the first correct simulator that broadcasts a VALUE'WITNESS (x, v) message must also have received VALUE'VALID (x, v) messages from strictly more than n+t 2 different processes. There must then be a correct simulator that sent both VALUE'VALID (x, −) messages. The only place a correct simulator can send a VALUE'VALID (x, −) message is at Line 15 and it does so only once for each simulator q x , a contradiction which concludes the proof of the lemma. Proof Let us recall that the algorithm implementing the operation decide() is described at lines C15-C19. Let q i and q j be two correct simulators. According to Lemmas 15-17, we have:
Let us assume, by contradiction, that q i and q j decide different values. This means that the sets min_σ i and min_σ j computed at line C17 by q i and q j , respectively, are different.
Since min_σ i and min_σ j are different, let us consider z ∈ min_σ i \ min_σ j (if min_σ i min_σ j , swap i and j). According to the closure predicate used at line C16, as z / ∈ min_σ j , we have ∀y ∈ min_σ j :
It follows that q j received VIEW'WITNESS (y, all_view j [y]) messages (with all_view j [y][z] = ⊥) from a set of simulators Q j,vw of size strictly larger than n+t 2 (the subscript vw stands for "view witness"). The correct simulators of Q j,vw sent these messages after checking at line B39 that a set Q j,vw,r of strictly more than n+t 2 reliably broadcast (thanks to the mechanism of lines B26 to B33) a READ'ANSWER (y, z, ⊥) message. The correct simulators of Q j,vw,r sent these messages at line B26 after they received VALUE'ACK (y, v y ) messages from a set Q y,w of strictly more than n+t 2 simulators (the subscript w stands for "witness"). Each correct simulator q k of Q y,w had values k [y] = v y when it sent this message and it happens strictly before the first correct simulator sends a READ'ANSWER (y, z, ⊥) message.
Since z ∈ min_σ i , the correct simulator q i received VIEW'WITNESS (z, all_view i [z]) messages from a set Q i,vw of strictly more than n+t 2 simulators. The correct simulators of Q i,vw sent these messages after the check of the values at lines B38-B39.
Suppose that some of them verified the predicate of line B39 for x = y. It entails that a set Q i,vw,r of strictly more than n+t 2 simulators reliably broadcast a READ'ANSWER (z, y, ⊥). The correct simulators of Q i,vw,r sent this message after receiving at line B24 VALUE'ACK (z, v z ) messages from a set Q z,w of strictly more than n+t 2 simulators. This happens strictly before the first READ'ANSWER (z, y, ⊥) message is sent by a correct simulator. Since |Q i,vw,r |, |Q j,vw,r | > According to the predicate of line C16, this entails that y ∈ min_σ i , and since the previous reasoning holds for any y ∈ min_σ j , it shows that min_σ j ⊆ min_σ i . It follows that, when q i executes line C17, ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views i [y] = ⊥ and, consequently, ∀y ∈ min_σ j : all_views i [y] = all_views j [y]. It entails that if |min_σ j | < |min_σ i |, then min_σ j would have been chosen by q i at line C17, which proves that min_σ i = min_σ j and contradicts the fact that q i and q j decide differently.
2 Lemma 18 Correct values are valid Lemma 19. If a correct simulator q i decides the value v, there is a correct simulator q j such that valid j (−, v).
Proof
Let v be the value decided by a correct simulator q i . Value v has then be proposed by a simulator q j such that all_views i [j] = ⊥ (definition of σ at lines 15-C16 and choice of value at line C18). In order to assign a non-⊥ value to all_views i [j], q i must have received VIEW'WITNESS(j, −) messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators (lines B47-B48), and consequently from at least one correct simulator. Consider the first correct simulator q x that has broadcast a VIEW'WITNESS(j, −) message. Before sending it, it must have assigned a non-⊥ value to values x [j] (lines B35-B42). It then has received either (a) VALUE'WITNESS(j, −) messages from more than In case (a), consider the first correct simulator q k that has broadcast a VALUE'WITNESS(j, −) message. In order to do so, it must have received VALUE'VALID(j, −) messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators (lines B16-17). The predicate valid k (j, v) must have been satisfied at the simulators that broadcast these messages(line B15). In case (b), the first correct simulator that has broadcast a VALUE'ACK(j, −) message must first have received VALUE'WITNESS(j, −) messages from more than n+t 2 different simulators (lines B21-B23). The situation is then similar to Case (a).
2 Lemma 19 Theorem 4. The algorithms described in Figure 3 and Figure 4 implement a safe-agreement object in BAMP n,t [t < n/3].
Proof The proof follows from the previous lemmas.
2 Theorem 4 5.6 Simulation algorithm and its proof in BAMP n,t [t < n/3]
Simulation algorithm When we consider the simulation algorithm described in Figure 2 , we observe that the n simulators communicate only through safe agreement objects. It follows that the same algorithm works in BAMP n,t [t < n/3], when the crash-tolerant safe agreement objects are replaced by Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects previously described. Two things remain to be done: define the specific sub-predicate P 2 of the predicate valid(), and do a specific proof of this algorithm (i.e., a proof based on the specification of the Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects defined in Section 5.2).
Sub-predicate P 2 As far as P 2 is concerned we have the following. Let us consider the simulator q i that invokes valid i (j, v), with respect to the simulation of a process p x . In the simulation algorithm, the parameter v is the message msg that q j proposes to a safe agreement object from which will be decided the next message to be received by the simulated process p x (lines 08-09 of Figure 2 ). P 2 checks, from q i 's local point of view, that, if the message v has been sent in the simulation, then it has not yet been consumed, i.e.,
Proof of the simulation algorithm in BAMP n,t [t < n/3] Lemma 20. The simulation of at most t simulated processes can be blocked.
The only places where a correct simulator q i can block is during the invocation of the safe agreement operation decide(). Such invocations appear at line 02, and line 11.
Because the invocations by all the correct simulators of decide() on all the safe agreement objects terminate, except for at most t safe agreement objects (Lemma 14), the simulation of at most t simulated processes can be blocked.
2 Lemma 20 Lemma 21. The simulation of the reception of the k-th message received by a simulated process p j , returns the same message at all correct simulators.
Proof The simulation of the message receptions for a simulated process p j , are executed at each correct simulator q i at lines 08-11, and all the correct simulators use the same sequence of sequence numbers (line 07 Proof The only non-deterministic elements of the simulation are the input vectors input i [1.
.n ] at each simulator q i , and the reception of the simulated messages. The lines 01-02 of the simulation force the correct simulators to agree on the same input value for each simulated process p j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n . Similarly, as shown by Lemma 21, for each simulated process p j , the lines 07-11 direct the simulators to agree on the very same sequence of messages received by p j . It follows from the fact that the function δ j () is deterministic, that any two correct simulators q i and q k , that execute lines 15-16 during the same "round number"
2 Lemma 22 Lemma 23. The sequences of message receptions simulated by each simulator q i on behalf of each simulated process p j , define a correct execution of the simulated algorithm.
Proof To prove the correctness of the simulation, we have to show that 1. Every message that was received by a simulated process was sent by another simulated process, 2. Every message that was sent by a simulated process to another simulated process (whose simulation is not blocked either), is received, and 3. The simulated messages respect a simulated physical order (i.e., no message is "received" before being "sent").
Item 1 follows from Lemma 19 and from the definition of P 2. Item 2 is satisfied because the messages sent by the simulated process p j to the simulated process p k are received (lines 09-11) in their sending order (as defined at line 04 and line 14). Hence, if p k is not blocked (due to a faulty simulator) it obtains the messages from p j in their sending order.
For Item 3, let us define a (simulated) physical order as follows. For each simulated message m, let us consider the first time at which the reception of m was simulated (i.e., this occurs when -for the first timea simulator terminates the invocation of SA[−, −].decide() that returns m). A message that is decided has been proposed by a simulator to a safe agreement object before being decided (validity property).The sending time of a simulated message is then the first time at which SA[−, −].propose(m) is invoked by a simulator. It follows that any simulated message is sent before being received, which concludes the lemma. 2 Lemma 23 Lemma 24. Each correct simulator q i computes the decision value of at least (n − t) simulated processes.
Proof Due to Lemma 20, and the fact that at most t simulators may be byzantine, it follows that at most t simulated processes may be prevented from progressing. As (a) by assumption the simulated algorithm A is t-resilient, and (b) due to Lemma 23 the simulation produces a correct simulation of A , it follows that at least (n − t) simulated processes decide a value.
2 Lemma 24 Theorem 5. Let A be an algorithm solving a decision task in CAMP n ,t [t < n ]. The algorithm described in Figure 2 , in which Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects are used, is a correct simulation of A in BAMP n,t [t < n/3].
Proof The theorem follows from Lemma 23 and Lemma 24.
2 Theorem 5 Additionally, the reader can easily check that the simulation of a message only requires a polynomial number of messages in the base system, and the increase in size of these messages, when compared to the size of the simulated message, is also polynomial.
6 Implications of the Simulation BG-simulation in Byzantine message-passing systems A main result of this paper is a signature-free distributed algorithm that solves BG-simulation in Byzantine asynchronous message-passing systems. In addition to being the first algorithm that solves BG-simulation in such a severe failure context, the proposed simulation algorithm has noteworthy applications as shown below.
From Byzantine-failures to crash failures in message-passing systems The simulation presented here allows the execution of a t-resilient crash-tolerant algorithm in an asynchronous message-passing system where up to t processes may be Byzantine. A feature that is sometimes required from a Byzantine-tolerant algorithm solving a task (not usually considered in the crash failure case) is that the value decided by any correct process should be based only on inputs of correct processes. This prevents Byzantine processes from "polluting" the computation with their inputs. A way to guarantee that an input has been proposed by a correct process is to check that it has been proposed by at least (t + 1) different processes. Assuming that in any execution at most m values are proposed, this constraint translates as n − t > mt [16, 28] .
In the case of the simulation presented in Section 5, this requirement can easily be satisfied by adding a first step of computation before the start of the simulation. Simulators first broadcast their input. They then echo every value that they receive from more than t + 1 different simulators, and consider these values (and only these values) as valid inputs. An input considered valid by a correct simulator is then eventually considered valid by all correct simulators, and the only inputs allowed in the simulation are inputs of correct simulators. Because we consider colorless tasks, the choice of output is done in the same way as in the original BG-simulation: a simulator can adopt the output of any simulated process that has decided a value.
The possible Byzantine behaviors are restrained by the underlying Byzantine-tolerant safe agreement objects used in the simulation. Surprisingly, this shows that, from the point of view of the computability of colorless tasks and assuming n > (m + 1)t (this requirement always implies n > 3t when at least two different values can be proposed), Byzantine failures are equivalent to crash-failures. This provides us with a new understanding of Byzantine failures and shows that their impact can be restricted to the much simpler crash-failure case.
From wait-free shared memory to message-passing The proposed simulation can be combined with previous works to further extend the scope of the result. Consider an algorithm A 0 that solves a colorless task, where m > 1, in a wait-free read/write memory system of t + 1 processes, denoted CARW t+1,t [∅] . Using the basic BG-simulation [6] , this algorithm can be transformed into an algorithm A 1 that works in the t-resilient read/write memory system of (m + 1)t + 1 processes, in which at most t can crash. This model is denoted CARW (m+1)t+1,t [∅] . Using an implementation of a read/write memory in a crash-prone messagepassing system in which a majority of processes are correct [2] , we obtain an algorithm A 2 which work in CAMP (m+1)t+1,t [∅] (message-passing system system of (m + 1)t + 1 processes, in which at most t can crash; notice that m > 0 ⇒ (m + 1)t + 1 > 2t)). Finally, using the simulation presented in this paper, we obtain Byzantine-tolerant algorithm A 3 which works in BAMP (m+1)t+1,t [∅] (message-passing system of (m + 1)t + 1 processes, of which at most t can be Byzantine; notice that m > 1 ⇒ (m + 1)t + 1 > 3t).
These transformations show that, as far as the computability of colorless tasks that admit up to m > 1 different input values is concerned, an n-process Byzantine-prone message-passing system, in which up to t < n/(m + 1) processes can be Byzantine, is equivalent to a wait-free shared memory system of t + 1 processes, which at most commit crash failures. When considering colorless tasks with m > 1, a figure relating these transformations is depicted in Figure 6 . Differently from the full-information algorithm presented in [28] , the simulation presented in the present paper (along with [6] and [2] ) allows a direct transformation of any wait-free shared-memory algorithm that solves a colorless task into a message-passing Byzantine-tolerant algorithm.
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